potlatch

new paper: The Emerging Neo-communitarianism

I've had an article accepted by Political Quarterly (Andrew Gamble's last act as editor, no less; there's one for an incredibly niche and tedious pub quiz) entitled 'The Emerging Neo-Communitarianism'. It'll be published in October, but I've uploaded a pre-print here.

This was a paper I initially presented in Delhi last year, in the Rising Powers symposium. It attempts to interpret and characterise emerging forms of government, in terms of micro-political departures from key tenets of neoliberalism. By abandoning the Hayekian and the neo-classical emphasis on an autonomous, choosing individual, to be governed through prices and incentives, in favour of a more social and habitual individual, policy-makers are moving towards a form of 'neo-communitarianism'. Neo-communitarianism is to communitarianism as neoliberalism is to liberalism, that is, it is a technocratic, economised derivative of a moral and political philosophy.

If you're still reading, this chart lays out a typology of the two rival styles or logics of government that the paper explores:

The paper is pretty speculative in its outlook. Clearly we do not have a grand new paradigmatic idea, such as Keynesian demand management. But perhaps scholars and policy-makers need to accept that crises do not always occasion grand paradigm shifts, but also occasion more subtle and organic changes, which enable governments to simply cope. The belief that an Idea, probably produced by some brilliant grey-haired man in a university, will rescue us, may be a comfort blanket we need to abandon.

Leveson and the cultural contradictions of conservatism

With the usual half-hearted apologies for recycling my own chat, watching the delightful spectacle of the Murdoch clan and the Tories knocking chunks out of each other reminds me of this piece on the cultural contradictions of conservatism I wrote last summer, when Hackgate first exploded:

The greater significance of ‘hack-gate’ will lie in how it affects the character of British conservatism more generally. Conservatism, as a cultural and political movement, is intrinsically unwieldy and self-destructive, as hack-gate may now be demonstrating once more. From Edmund Burke’s critique of the French Revolution onwards, conservatism has achieved its identity through what it rejects and despises. It projects a pessimistic scepticism towards political deliberation as a basis for authority, insisting that modern societies are too complex, human beings too different, and language too frail, for us to reason our way towards a collective destination...

All modern conservatives have a love-hate relationship with the establishment, which ultimately is their undoing. They can never really make up their mind whether they want more government or less. Complaints about bureaucrats, ‘red tape’ and tax are matched by despair that the state has lost its nerve in various ways, until this ambivalence is eventually overwhelmed by events. Political leaders and parties that appeal to ‘traditional values’ are undermined by revelations of fraud and sexual intrigue; financial markets that are untouchable because ‘self-correcting’ end up costing the taxpayer a figure that is (according to the National Audit Office ^↑ ) more than eight times the annual budget of the NHS; military efforts to impose democracy eventually retreat into actual negotiation. That News International profited fabulously from highlighting all of these hypocrisies and U-turns in the past does not mean that the public won’t take some glee in witnessing the latest contradiction of conservatism: Rupert Murdoch’s inner circle being investigated by the Metropolitan Police, cheered on by the families of murdered children, military charities and – no doubt – the vast majority of the ‘great British public’. How loudly the Conservative Prime Minister is prepared to cheer may be crucial to how this conflict plays out.

To paraphrase the old American political adage, we might now say: "watch two pigs mud-wrestling; they both get dirty, but you can enjoy it."

Nylumni journal issue

Over the course of my PhD, I had the great pleasure of taking part in the NYLON network, organised by Craig Calhoun and Richard Sennett at NYU and LSE. And thanks to Melissa Aronczyk and Ailsa Craig, there was an excellent alumni meeting in Ottawa last year, with papers presented within the general theme of 'cultures of circulation'. We even got to use one of Carleton University's log cabins:

A selection of these papers has now appeared as a special issue of Poetics, introduced with a piece by Melissa and Ailsa, and featuring a number of really great papers.

My contribution is called Ways of Owning: towards an economic sociology of privatisation (open access pre-print here) looks at why economic sociology has been so preoccupied by the institution of markets, at the relative expense of property. My argument is, firstly, that it has inherited certain idioyncratic liberal preoccupations from the 19th century, of examining the separation of 'economy' from 'society', which can be interpreted as an effect of markets. But as a result, sociologists have implicitly bought into a worldview that believes goods spontaneously move around of their own accord, without recognising the huge amount of work that goes into facilitating this (or preventing it), in the form of property rights.

What I've tried to do - probably over-ambitiously - is to then set out a framework through which normative arguments over property can be analysed at work within the economy. Building on the pragmatic sociology of Boltanski, Thevenot et al, I identify three conflicting 'orders of appropriation': socialist (the critique of privatisation), neoliberal (the critique of socialisation) and liberal (justifying the separation of private and public). The point is to try and move away from the conceptual disagreements between scholars and theorists, and towards those going on 'in the wild' amongst economic actors themselves.

Hence, a single institution (e.g. an investment bank) might be riddled with its own conflicting philosophies of what does or does not constitute 'property'. For example, value is both a shared social asset within a firm (such as 'tacit knowledge'), but a private piece of 'property' to its shareholders; there is a necessary contradiction here. During the finanial crisis, the banks' capacity to shift from a rhetoric of neoliberalism (risks could and should be entirely privatised) to one of socialism (risks could and should be entirely socialised) represented a key political asset, as many have pointed out. I make the possibly implausible argument that bankers displayed a Marxist sensibility at the crucial moment. But this then leaves the question hanging of how we might restore a liberal critique, of separating what ought to be private risk from what ought to be public risk; this problem is unresolved.

what do banks and prisons have in common?

I've published an article at openDemocracy, as part of the Uneconomics debate, in which I attempt to stand back and take a wide-ranging look at the policy dilemmas posed by the banking system. There is, I suggest, a serious problem in that the state has become an under-writer for a wasteful and ineffective risk management system, on which it cannot now easily turn its back. In that respect, the financial system has become like the prison system: a poorly calculated strategy for reducing risk, which may have the exact opposite effect, but which the taxpayer has become entangled with. As I argue:

Nearly five years after the dawning of the financial crisis, we can now identify one of its possible long-term legacies: the implicit association between the modern state and large financial institutions has become an explicit one. It is no longer possible to specify exactly where the state ends and the banking system begins...

We are living with a situation in which billions of pounds of public money is still being effectively siphoned into the pockets of private individuals, via quantitative easing and other forms of support for the banking sector. The on-going hand-wringing over the 'fairness' of bankers' pay tends to ignore the graver public insult, that billions of pounds are being removed from the banking system in the form of bonuses, which the taxpayer will have to provide if the system collapses again. Gordon Brown cites figures ^↑ showing that if bankers had reduced their pay by a mere 10 per cent between 2000-2007, the banks would have had £50bn more of capital available to them when the crisis struck, which is the same amount that the government injected into RBS and Lloyds-TSB in October 2008.

There is a structural problem here that has still not been dealt with. If this situation is to change, the government will need to take risks with its modus operandi of risk management. While regulators and policy-makers view the future via traditional risk management techniques, they will effectively endorse traditional risk management institutions of the City of London. Only with an ethos of experimentation can anything genuinely new be anticipated and valued.

You can read the rest of the article here. Comments might be better placed underneath the article itself, rather than on this blog.

New paper on Europe and the neoliberal 'exception'

I've had an article accepted by Theory Culture & Society, entitled 'When is a market not a market?: 'Exemption', 'externality' and 'exception' in the case of European State Aid rules', which I've now uploaded a pre-print version of. This paper was originally something I prepared for a seminar last summer, as part of the Rising Powers network I took part in (and also wrote this paper [pdf] for).

The paper attempts to identify the various logics and justifications through which neoliberalism delineates the limits of the market, or rather, the limits of certain market-based forms of economic reasoning. Clearly, the assumption that any society allows markets or economic logic to determine everything is falsified by simply walking down the street or reading the newspaper. So the question (as posed by Karl Polanyi) is where and how to draw the line around market principles and values; Keynes famously said that this was what Hayek had no capacity to do, but pragmatically speaking, states do manage it. One way that these limits are codified is in EU State Aid rules, which is why I thought that would be an interesting empirical place to look.

I guess the contemporary pertinence of this paper, if there is any at all, is in how I've attempted to theorise the current condition of (European) neoliberalism as existing in a state of exception, in which market norms and techniques are constantly dependent on necessary forms of executive intervention for their survival. Hence, neoliberalism lives on, but only on the condition that it is in a possibly long-term state of emergency. This can be shown empirically via the shifting emphasis of the Commission, away from a logic of 'market failure' as a justification for state intervention, towards a logic of necessity, at least for a period of time.

Here are some of the paper's conclusions:

How long does this state of exception last and how far does it extend? One criterion by which Aid to banks would be considered compatible with State Aid rules was that it be reviewed at least every six months (EC, 2008b). In December 2008, the Commission announced a new ‘Temporary framework’ authorising necessary rescue packages in the ‘real economy’ (i.e. non-financial firms), such as loans and guarantees that the financial sector was itself unable to offer (EC, 2008c). This framework expired on 31^st December 2010, and subsequent communications were issued to provide guidance on the phasing out of Aid to financial institutions (EC, 2010). Statements made by the Commission therefore indicate a desire to terminate the formally recognised exception to market-based principles and techniques of valuation. But this doesn’t mean that these principles and techniques are now restored to the status of state-endorsed norms. On the contrary, the exception does not need to be legally validated or recognised to persist; that is its definition. From a Schmittian perspective, the legality of sovereign rule always tacitly allows for non-legal acts. But moments of rupture and publicly declared states of exception create the possibility of permanently exceptional states, in which executive political power acquires the legal right to act purely out of necessity, and without justification. Whether or not the European Commission recognises this as an accurate depiction of European neoliberalism post-2008, this may be what has emerged.

 There is an inherent conflict in the relationship between economics and sovereignty, as explored by Foucault, which shapes the unwieldy character of the neoliberal state. The Euro crisis of 2010 can be seen as a consequence of this, in which a transnational market logic was created in place of national sovereignty, but without any political sovereignty of its own. As Peck argues, “neo-liberalism’s curse has been that it can live neither with, nor without, the state” (Peck, 2008: 39). The European monetary crisis is serving up new attempted solutions to this contradiction. The appointment of economists as unelected Prime Ministers of Greece and Italy in 2011 takes the attempted synthesis of economics and sovereign power to unprecedented heights, and casts a thoroughly more Hobbesian light upon the possible ‘performativity’ of economics. Meanwhile, whatever imbalances of European national power may once have been concealed by the liberal rhetoric of a post-national European project, are now naked as the survival of the single currency becomes predicated upon the obedience of southern European citizens to the demands of German and French national leaders. In its apparent state of exception, the European project is one of discretion and political decision, as much as one of judicial rule...

In the years that have followed the rescue of European banks, a number of scholars have questioned whether neoliberalism is alive or dead, or in some type of ‘zombie’ state (Harman, 2009; Peck et al. 2010). The unfolding of the European sovereign debt crisis over the course of 2010 and 2011 has forced constant decisions and dilemmas upon state actors, who face repeatedly unprecedented situations in which the ‘normal’ market order faces an existential threat. Senior politicians and senior bankers now negotiate face to face, to try and identify shared interests. In answer to the question of whether neoliberalism is alive or dead, it seems entirely plausible to speak of an on-going or permanent state of neoliberal exception. Agamben identifies one case of exception in the Roman institution of iustitium, in which law would go on ‘holiday’ while the republic fought for its survival. Iustitium is neither legal nor illegal; in fact it is not a legal category at all, but a juridical vacuum. The present actions of European states and European Commission are perhaps neither compatible with market-based principles and techniques of valuation, nor contrary to them, but operating in a market vacuum.

Anyway, that's quite enough. It's a paper I feel quite proud of, as it knits together a number of theoretical and empirical interests of mine of the last few years, and hopefully casts some light on the present. Any thoughts very welcome. I can't say when it will appear in print.

Erik Olin Wright lecture on Worker-owned Cooperatives - 23rd May - Oxford

I'm organising and chairing this event with Erik Olin Wright in Oxford on 23rd May. All welcome!

 

Worker-owned Cooperatives: A niche in capitalism or a pathway beyond?

A lecture by Professor Erik Olin Wright, University of Wisconsin

5pm-6.30pm, Wednesday 23rd May, 2012

Lecture Theature, Department of Politics and International Relations, Manor Road Building, Manor Road, Oxford

Worker-owned Cooperatives have an ambiguous relationship to capitalism as an economic system. On the one hand, worker coops constitute a distinctive organizational form that occupies a small niche compatible with a well-functioning capitalist economy. On the other hand, worker-owned and managed firms violate in fundamental ways the class character of capitalism by being organized on democratic egalitarian principles. This contradictory relationship between cooperatives and capitalism poses an important question for critics of capitalism: To what extent could worker cooperatives ever constitute a significant component of an alternative to capitalism?

This lecture, hosted jointly by Oxford University's Centre for Mutual and Employee-owned Business, Public Policy Unit and Centre for the Study of Social Justice, will explore worker-owned cooperatives, as a case of what Wright terms 'real utopias'. It will feature a response by Prof Stuart White (Politics) and be chaired by Dr. Will Davies (Centre for Mutual and Employee-owned Business).

No registration is required. Please email william.davies@kellogg.ox.ac.uk for any further details about this event.

more Uneconomics

Aaron Peters invited me on to his Resonance FM show a few weeks ago to discuss the Uneconomics debate I'm editing. There are a few moments where my chat grows a little weary (no doubt wearisome) but I figured I would post it up here. And while I'm discussing my ongoing war with the economic technocracy, here's a photo of me and Larry Summers arguing over whose pizza that is. Enjoy.

new ownership reports

Jonathan Michie and I have authored a report for the Wales Co-operative Centre, on the risks of business succession (especially in very small businesses), the social costs of succession failures and how employee buy-outs can avert these. You can download the report here. In other ownership news, check out the final report from the Ownership Commission, which Jonathan was a Commissioner on and I provided some research assistance for.

Uneconomics latest

The Uneconomics debate is now up and running (RSS feed), with excellent contributions from Judith Marquand, Oliver Huitson and Glen O'Hara. There'll be a typically biting piece from Phillip Mirowski next. Watch this space. And email me if you have ideas for contributions or contributors.

Uneconomics: new debate

I've launched a new debate or essay series at openDemocracy, under the title of 'Uneconomics'. Its purpose is twofold. Firstly, to criticise the monochrome economic world, as depicted by orthodox economists, which they increasingly assist in governing and shaping. And secondly, to bring alternative forms of economic analysis and depictions to light, which are too often marginalised within the academy, and virtually ignored by policy-makers and within the public sphere. I'm keen to hear from anyone who might want to contribute an article, especially if they have empirical research that challenges orthodox assumptions, might alter public understanding or the definition of policy problems, and therefore demands a broader readership than academic journals can achieve (email me). David Graeber, and especially his recent book on debt, is a model of what we should be aiming for. There will be contributions from Judith Marquand and Philip Mirowski in the next week or two, and I should have some other interesting contributions in the pipeline.

You can read my opening gambit here, which is a polemical attempt to define what's at stake:

It is time to acknowledge an uncomfortable truth about the public status of economics as an expert discipline: it has grown to be far more powerful as a tool of political rhetoric, blame avoidance and elite strategy than for the empirical representation of economic life. This is damaging to politics, for it enables value judgements and political agendas to be endlessly presented in ‘factual’ terms. But it is equally damaging to economics, which is losing the authority to describe reality in a credible, disinterested, Enlightenment fashion. 

The status of economists in public life has taken many twists and turns, since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations was published in 1776. The classical political economists, such as David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, were engaged public intellectuals, whose analysis covered institutions, politics and morals. It was only after the ‘marginal revolution’ of the 1870s that economics reappeared in its neo-classical manifestation, the form with which we associate the term ‘economics’ today. In drastically delimiting the scope of economics to the study of rational decision-making by individuals, the marginalists withdrew from describing capitalism or society, creating space for rival social sciences to emerge for this purpose.

This has already attracted some scornful responses in the comments. This issue is clearly not new, but I thought it would be an opportune moment to revive some of these questions, alongside so much debate about the morality of capitalism.